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30/7/2010

News/ AFGHANISTAN NEWS

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2007-06-28

AFGHAN OPIUM PRODUCTION SOARS BY HALF IN 2006 [08:49:00]

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) says illegal opium production in Afghanistan increased by nearly half in 2006 compared to the record harvest of a year earlier. In a report released today in Vienna, the UNODC says Afghanistan accounted for practically all the world’s illegal opium production during 2006. The report says Afghanistan produced dramatically more opium in 2006, increasing its yield by almost 50 percent from a year earlier and pushing global opium production to a new record high. The authors say that the Afghan increase boosted global opium production from 3,800 tons in 2005 to 6,600 tons in 2006. Opium is the main ingredient for heroin. ’Weak Link’ UNODC research expert Thomas Pietschmann says Afghanistan is clearly a black spot in the world when it comes to cultivation of the opium poppy. "The really serious problem we face in the world, this is Afghanistan," Pietschmann says. "Ninety-two percent of the world’s [opium] production is in Afghanistan. We have seen a dramatic increase in production in the year 2006 -- 49 percent in production in Afghanistan -- mostly in southern provinces. And there is no question that Afghanistan is the weak link at the moment." UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa warns that within Afghanistan, the insurgency-plagued southern province of Helmand is becoming the center of supply, with illicit cultivation larger than in the rest of the country put together. Costa says that if the opium production in Helmand could be curbed, it would rid the world of the most dangerous source of its most dangerous narcotic. He blames the endemic poverty, corruption, and warfare for creating the right conditions for such massive production of illegal drugs. "The situation in Afghanistan is not acceptable, but not only because of the drug situation -- because of the poverty, because of instability, because of the corruption, because of the insurgency," Costa says. "The great increase in drug cultivation and [drug] processing which we have seen in the last couple of years is a consequence of that. It’s not necessarily the trigger of all that." Poppy Density The report says that no other drug in the world is produced in such a concentrated, single area. Pietschmann says that what is needed to wean farmers away from poppy cultivation is to end the insurgency and give local farmers an alternative with which they can earn money. He says that, at present, the link between the Taliban-led insurgency and the cultivation of opium poppies is clear. "What has to be done is a combination of strengthening the rule of law -- there’s a lot of insurgents in the south of the country, precisely in these areas where you have the highest levels of cultivation and production in the country -- but in parallel, you have to strengthen alternative development assistance going to the farmers," Pietschmann says. "At the moment, because there is such an insurgency, all of the alternative development programs are not working in the south of the country. So you have to break this vicious circle." Another significant change in the illegal drug market is that laboratories inside Afghanistan are now converting 90 percent of the opium into heroin and morphine before smuggling it around the world. AFP news agency quotes UNODC officials as saying in Kabul that until two years ago, Afghanistan exported almost exclusively raw opium. The report says that even if the outlook in Afghanistan is bleak, there has been success in curbing opium production in the so-called Golden Triangle, where Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos meet. There, the cultivation of poppies has fallen by almost 80 percent in the last decade.

EURASIA_NET

2007-05-15

AFGHANISTAN: THE GOVERNMENT SEEKS STABILITY VIA DIALOGUE WITH ENEMIES [09:37:00]

If you can’t beat them, talk to them: Afghanistan’s embattled government is now espousing this approach as it struggles to contain the Taliban insurgency and keep reconstruction from going completely off the rails. With violence continuing to rise, Afghan leaders v from President Hamid Karzai on down v are placing an increasing emphasis on negotiations, seeming to diverge from the forceful approach employed by NATO and American troops in the country. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. On May 4, Afghan and Pakistani officials agreed to hold their first-ever joint Peace Jirga, a gathering that will bring together roughly 700 tribal elders, politicians, intellectuals and other civil society leaders to discuss ways to check the growth of Taliban militant action, and to promote regional stability. The conclave is scheduled to begin August 1 in Kabul. Relations between Afghan and Pakistani leaders have long been frosty. Pakistan was a sponsor of the Taliban from the time of the radical Islamic movement’s appearance in the mid-1990s up until its ouster from power in Kabul in late 2001 amid the US blitz. Bilateral tension has remained high in recent months, as Afghan leaders believe Pakistan is still sheltering and abetting Taliban militants. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Pakistan’s decision to erect a frontier fence, ostensibly an effort to hinder the Taliban’s cross-border movements, has also angered Afghanistan, which does not recognize the so-called Durand Line dividing the two states. Given the mutual hostility, the fact that Afghan and Pakistani leaders have set a meeting date is significant. Yet, the jirga’s agenda, rules and names of participants remain to be defined. These details are expected to be addressed during a meeting involving Afghan and Pakistani officials in Islamabad at the end of May. Karzai first raised the idea of a peace jirga during a meeting last September with US President George W. Bush and Pakistani leader Gen. Pervez Musharraf. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Karzai’s main aim is to build consensus among Pashtun tribal elders on both sides of the border in opposition to extremism. Karzai also wants to show the international community that the bulk of Pashtuns do not support the Talibanization of their homeland. Ultimately, if such consensus can be achieved, Afghanistan and Pakistan would be better positioned to address the underlying causes of Talibanization, in particular widespread poverty and the lack of opportunity. While Afghan leaders have resisted until now to engage in a dialogue with the Taliban, Pakistani leaders have over the past few years pursued a policy of accommodation with Islamic militants in the country’s tribal areas. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The policy has a very mixed record of success, and Afghan and American officials believe Islamabad’s lack of vigilance has enabled the Taliban to use the tribal areas as a safe-haven. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Pakistani officials deny the existence of safe havens. The peace jirga will serve as a litmus test to measure the willingness of both countries to address issues fueling instability in the Pashtun borderlands. According to a joint statement issued after a bilateral meeting in Istanbul in late April, Karzai and Musharraf shared the belief that "extremism and terrorism are a common threat to both Pakistan and Afghanistan." In addition, they "agreed to deny sanctuary, training and financing to terrorists and to elements involved in subversive and anti-state activities in each other’s country." The jirga will offer a concrete opportunity to turn those words into actions. Observers say significant obstacles stand in the way of success. As an institution, such gatherings are perceived very differently in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Jirgas are a central feature of public life in Afghanistan, as the country’s Constitution specifies that a Loya Jirga, or grand tribal council, is the supreme national decision-making body. In Pakistan, jirgas are viewed more as a social institution, encompassing mainly Pashtun, as well as a few Baluchi tribes. Such meetings have no tradition among other ethnic groups in Pakistan, and thus no political role at the national level. And although Pashtuns comprise about 20 percent of Pakistan’s 160 million population, they tend to be on the margins of public discourse. A major and still unresolved issue is the scope of the peace jirga’s authority. In traditional Pashtun jirgas, both the parties to a conflict agree before the start of deliberations on limits of the jirga’s power, as well as consent to abide by and implement the decisions taken. Such agreement, given the involvement of two sovereign states, could prove elusive. Even though the odds seem low that a jirga can produce the desired results, Afghan leaders appear more convinced than ever that stability can come to Afghanistan only through dialogue. To underscore this point, members of the upper house of the Afghan parliament voiced a desire May 9 to open formal talks with Taliban representatives in an attempt to persuade the militants to abandon the insurgency. Military efforts to defeat the Taliban of late have made few tangible battlefield gains, while serving to alienate significant numbers of Afghans. Incidents, such as the recent NATO air strike that left 21 civilians dead in Helmand Province, are helping the recruitment efforts of the Taliban, which aims to force the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country. Editor-s Note: Abubakar Siddique covers Afghanistan and Pakistan for EurasiaNet.

EURASIA_NET

2007-02-26

AFGHANISTAN: TALIBAN ATTACKS SIGNAL START OF SPRING OFFENSIVE [10:29:00]

Taliban fighters have launched a series of attacks this month across western, southern, and eastern Afghanistan -- signaling that their expected spring offensive is now under way. NATO officials say the Taliban has concentrated forces in at least five southern and western provinces of Afghanistan -- Helmand, Kandahar, Farah, Uruzgan, and Ghor. NATO spokesman Colonel Tom Collins says militants in those areas are preparing to carry out attacks in those provinces as part of an "expected spring offensive." Offensive Under Way? But Taliban commanders say they began their spring offensive on February 2 when militants seized the town of Musa Qala in Helmand Province. Militants continue to control Musa Qala, which is about 25 kilometers from a key reconstruction project in southern Afghanistan, the Kajaki hydroelectric dam. Meanwhile, correspondents at Kajaki report that several hundred British Royal Marines have been fighting on a daily basis to keep the Taliban far enough from the dam so that reconstruction work can continue. Security analysts say operations near the dam are likely to be the major focus of fighting throughout the spring. Meanwhile, in the western Farah Province, several hundred Taliban fighters seized the remote district of Bakwa on February 19. It was the second time this month that the Afghan government has lost control of a district. Early Attacks Within 24 hours, however, the Taliban vacated Bakwa, the district’s administrative center. That allowed 200 Afghan troops to be deployed in the town unopposed the next day. But scores of Taliban fighters are thought to have spread out across the remote district. Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, an expert on Islamic militants and author of the book "Taliban," tells RFE/RL that simultaneous mass attacks by the Taliban could pose a serious threat to NATO forces in the months ahead. "The Taliban last year fought positional warfare, trying to hold ground and hold territory in three provinces: Uruzgan, Helmand, and Kandahar," he said. "The danger this year is that they may try and launch heavy guerrilla attacks -- with perhaps 200 men at a time -- not just in three provinces but perhaps in six or seven provinces. Even in western Afghanistan. If they do that, NATO is going to be very stretched. That restricts NATO’s ability to counter a widespread Taliban offensive." As fighting raged in the provinces of Helmand and Farah this week, the Taliban simultaneously launched a series of smaller attacks in other parts of the country. On February 19, in the eastern Kunar Province, U.S. troops engaged Taliban fighters near the border with Pakistan in a clash that killed one U.S. soldier. Using Guerrilla Tactics Also on February 19, militants in the southern part of Uruzgan Province ambushed Afghan and NATO forces as they tried to dismantle a roadside bomb. Then, on February 20, a Taliban suicide bomber disguised as a doctor injured seven U.S. soldiers when he blew himself up at a hospital in the southeastern Khost Province. Ian Kemp, an independent London-based defense analyst, says the Taliban’s guerrilla tactics can give them an advantage when they carry out small isolated attacks. "The insurgents in Afghanistan, they are able to pick the time and place of their attacks," Kemp said. "And that is always going to give them an advantage. The NATO forces are going to be dispersed throughout the country. And they are going to be hard pushed to protect a number of high priority installations." Kemp says the main goal of the Taliban offensive is to undermine the confidence of ordinary Afghans in NATO-led and Afghan government security forces. Thousands Of Insurgents "What the Taliban is trying to achieve by this series of attacks -- as widespread as possible -- is to divert NATO efforts across the country," he said. "The Taliban knows that NATO cannot spread its troops throughout the country. And they are hoping to undermine confidence among the Afghan population -- both in NATO and in the ability of the Afghan security forces -- the police and the Afghan National Army." But Kemp say Taliban fighters make a fatal error when they mass together in large numbers to hold a town or strategic territory. "Often the pattern we see is that the Taliban launch an attack and then are able to say that they’ve retaken a town," he said. "But often the Taliban then fade away within a day or two before NATO has had an opportunity to counterattack. The NATO commanders on the ground actually prefer it if the Taliban take a village and stand and fight -- because NATO is able to deploy air power, to deploy artillery. It’s able to deploy well-trained infantry. Certainly, what is more difficult, is when the Taliban stage an operation and then disperse." Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah told Al-Jazeera television on February 22 that 6,000 Taliban fighters are now deployed across Afghanistan and are ready to carry out more guerrilla and suicide attacks. Last year, Taliban-led militants carried out about 140 suicide attacks in a wave of violence that made 2006 the bloodiest year of fighting in Afghanistan since the ouster of the Taliban regime in 2001.

EURASIA_NET

2007-01-15

AFGHANISTAN: LOCAL TALIBAN DEFEAT RAISES HOPES FOR DAM PROJECT [09:36:00]

NATO forces in Afghanistan say the destruction of a Taliban camp in Helmand Province has cleared the way for repairs on a major hydroelectric dam. Work was halted in 2006 due to resurgent Taliban violence, but engineers from USAID now hope to upgrade the Kajaki Dam and its electrical transmission lines to provide a reliable source of power for nearly 2 million people in southern Afghanistan. The British military operation targeting Taliban fighters in the northern part of Helmand Province began on January 1. After about a week, NATO officials announced that they had killed a local commander of insurgents who have been stalling a multimillion-dollar repair project on Kajaki Dam’s electricity-producing turbines, which lies near the source of the Helmand River. Worker Safety NATO-ISAF spokesman Dominic Whyte tells RFE/RL the alliance is confident that it can keep the area safe for construction workers and engineers who must live in a campsite near the dam. "The Kajaki Dam is a critical part of the infrastructure necessary for the redevelopment of Afghanistan," Whyte says. "ISAF forces operating in the area are patrolling to ensure the security of the wider area itself so that the necessary reconstruction work can take place. We do have troop locations -- forward operating bases. We also employ mobile patrols." James Franckiewicz, director of USAID’s Office of Infrastructure, Engineering, and Energy in Afghanistan, tells RFE/RL that Taliban fighters managed to stop all work at the dam site for more than half a year. "We’ve been on hold for about six or seven months right now," Franckiewicz says. "We had a subcontractor that was due to go into Kajaki at the site to start working in May [2006]; they were unable to get access. In fact, they demobilized everyone aside from the security people back in the summer of 2006." Franckiewicz explains that the halt of reconstruction work was a direct result of resurgent Taliban violence in Helmand Province. "The insurgency around the camp spiked last summer [2006] and got much worse," Franckiewicz says. "A lot of the workers deserted out of the site after the increased violence. They started receiving mortar rounds fairly regularly. And one of the conditions that USAID had put out is that the coalition had to stabilize the area -- a perimeter about three to five kilometers around our campsite -- in order to stop the incoming mortar rounds. The military has been focusing on this area for a while and those mortar rounds pretty much died away during the last couple of months." There are three key parts to USAID’s reconstruction project at Kajaki that Franckiewicz hopes will be completed by the summer of 2009 -- the upgrade of electricity-generating equipment, the installation of new power-transmission lines, and the construction of a road linking the Kajaki Dam site to Afghanistan’s main ring road. He says he expects workers back at the dam in February to start repairing damage to one of Kajaki’s existing two turbines. The workers also plan to install a new, third turbine -- which already is being shipped to Afghanistan. Obstacles To Delivery When work on the turbines is finished, Kajaki’s electricity-generating capacity will be more than double its current level. But servicing the infrastructure, and carrying all of that electricity to the nearby cities of Lashkar-Gah and Kandahar, is impossible on roads and transmission lines destroyed by decades of war. "The existing transmission line is in poor shape -- and we’re going to be rehabilitating the transmission line," Franckiewicz says. "There is about 190 kilometers of transmission line that we are going to build down there. And we’re going to build about 90 kilometers of access road from the main regional ring road up to Kajaki Dam site. The upgrade of the hydro-electric plant and the transmission line will give a reliable electricity supply for both Lashkar-Gah and Kandahar and a few villages that will be services along the transmission line." Franckiewicz says building the new transmission line will take longer than upgrading the dam’s hydroelectric stations. "We’re assuming as long as the security situation stabilizing and that we get cooperation from the coalition forces, we’re going to have the contractors mobilized in February and we’re going to finish the hydroelectric in 2007 -- by the end of this year," Franckiewicz says. "I would guess [it will be] around the summer of 2009 before the transmission line and road construction is completed." 200,000 Households Await If all goes according to plan, the project will affect the lives of hundreds of thousands of people in Afghanistan’s volatile southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. "What we have as total beneficiaries in this area that will benefit from the Kajaki upgrade is 1.7 million inhabitants," Franckiewicz says. "And we figure, just on the basis of approximately eight people per household, that there [are] about 200,000 households. I would assume you’re probably looking at somewhere from 30 to 50 percent of the people with their lightbulb power on in their residence. That’s what is available now. And what we’re looking at as possible, when we get this thing up and running, we assume that all of the households, businesses, and government are going to be able to have power for their basic needs." NATO-ISAF spokesman Whyte admits that it will be more difficult for NATO forces to protect the power transmission lines from Taliban attacks than it is to project the dam site itself. But Whyte says he hopes the benefits of an improved Kajaki Dam convince ordinary Afghans that it is in their best interest to cooperate with Afghan and NATO security forces who protect the system.

EURASIA_NET

2006-10-16

AFGHANISTAN: ISAF WARNING OFFERS CHANCE TO BREAK DESTRUCTIVE CYCLE [09:49:00]

All of the parties involved in Afghanistan’s stabilization process since the fall of the Taliban nearly five years ago (December 2001) tend to agree that security and reconstruction are two sides of the same coin. Indeed, as security has deteriorated to its worst levels since the new political order arose, the rebuilding effort has not fared much better. But while a lack of security is hampering reconstruction, especially in southern and eastern Afghanistan, policies might also be to blame for the lack of sustained progress. The commander of the NATO-led force in Afghanistan, the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), warned on October 8 that without visible improvements in the daily lives of ordinary Afghans in the next six months, up to 70 percent of Afghans could shift their allegiance to the Taliban-led insurgency. It was a stark and urgent reminder that there is still much work to be done in post-Taliban Afghanistan. British Lieutenant General David Richards’ comments led to defensive posturing by the Afghan government rather than turning its attention to a retooling of reconstruction plans. Comments Explained NATO tried to defuse tensions when ISAF issued a statement three days later. It said ISAF’s commander meant that "the next six months have to be used for effective reconstruction and development to ensure" the continuing support that the Afghan government enjoys among citizens. But Richards added ominously that he knows that "ISAF cannot take the support of ordinary Afghans for granted." Richards pledged that having "shown [its] skill and power in combat," NATO is "now putting equal effort into supporting the reconstruction and development that will improve [Afghans’] lives and offer a real future to all." Richards’ warning is a very real one for Afghanistan. The crux of the matter arguably is not whether Afghans will support the resurgent neo-Taliban, but whether -- in the absence of a genuine improvement of their daily lives -- they care to support the current system. The operative word is "genuine." Security Needed For Reconstruction Donors are rightfully proud that billions of dollars have poured into Afghanistan. But little of that international aid has filtered down to the average Afghan. In a vicious cycle, security is blamed for slow reconstruction and the failure to rebuild is said to lead to deteriorating security. A reevaluation of the reconstruction projects implemented in Afghanistan in the last five years would undoubtedly reveal mistakes. Many shortcomings might be related to a focus on shorter-term projects that the donors and Afghan government alike have tried to use to demonstrate progress to their respective constituencies -- or even to each other. In other words, the emphasis thus far has not been on infrastructure but on Potemkin projects. But the infrastructure work is necessary in pursuit of long-term, state-building strategies despite its lack of immediate political benefits. Another, and more crucial, shortcoming has been a heavy reliance on foreign contractors to rebuild Afghanistan. Foreign contractors continue to boast of multimillion-dollar reconstruction projects while the average Afghan worker remains untrained and unemployed. Involving Afghans in all aspects of reconstruction would do more than simply employ the countless people who otherwise might find work in the booming narcotics industry. It might also counter the type of frustration to which Richards alluded -- prompting some to join the armed opposition. Afghan Workers Needed It is true that there is a serious shortage of skilled laborers in Afghanistan. Foreign expertise is necessary to train Afghans. But allowing Afghans to rebuild their own houses, schools, and roads would give them more than just ownership and pride -- it would also provide them with legal incomes. "Afghanizing" reconstruction projects would likely slow some work. It might also prove more challenging to adapt to the many demands of international donors and Kabul, possibly preventing them from signing off projects as due dates arise. But as one UN official put it recently, Afghan-built schools have somehow proven to be fireproof. He meant to suggest that those reconstruction projects built by Afghans seem to be targeted less by the insurgents. If the nation is sufficiently involved in rebuilding the Afghan state, then the massive project that began with the ousting of the Taliban in 2001 might be steered toward the formation of a fully functioning nation-state. Otherwise, in six months, General Richards might regret having toned down his poignant warning.

EURASIA_NET

2006-08-26

AFGHAN TRAVELOGUE LEAVES A LASTING IMPRESSION [12:27:00]

Four years ago, only weeks a US-led military offensive drove the Taliban from power, Rory Stewart embarked on a wild and dangerous odyssey v walking across Afghanistan entirely on foot, oblivious to the elements and to the lingering presence of Islamic radicals. The journey is recounted in Stewart’s book, The Places in Between. The story depicts the lives of ordinary Afghans with clarity and without geopolitical spin. And like other great travel tales, it leaves the reader with a heightened sense of humility and hope. This book begins as a gimmick and ends as something more like an epic. Before starting the book, I wondered if Stewart, a journalist with both military and diplomatic experience, was just another callow book-deal prospector going on a cultural safari. But such an impression was quickly dispelled. Along his walk, Stewart becomes more than a guide, he becomes a sojourner. He delves carefully into history and discreetly into gore. He draws the people he sees well, with words and sketches, and distinguishes his personal impulses from his policy questions. Afghanistan elicits his warmth and his fear. That makes for rewarding storytelling. The Places in Between intertwines personal journey with historic inquiry. To Stewart’s credit, he acknowledges that both are murky prospects. As the walk proceeds, Stewart boasts less about his zaniness and parses words more carefully when depicting stubborn guards or bureaucrats. At the same time, he casts himself as a (stumbling) liar with a foul temper who shows more patience with a stray dog than a destitute old man. So as Stewart deflects shakedowns and scolds plunderers, he serves more as a proxy than a guide. His writing chronicles all times of day and variations in mood, so we feel as if we’re on the trip with him. When he crashes, we feel his exhaustion. The book’s other device, a recreation of a journey by the 16th-century emperor Babur, slices between cultural reporting and ethno-religious scholarship. It could easily become precious in the metaphors of a less adept writer. Instead of cutesy analogies or protestations of weakness, we see Stewart sleep and eat and bitch. All these processes elicit careful thought. We see him in Hazarajat, at once exploiting and appreciating and questioning Afghan hospitality. Stewart’s voice stays conversational, the writing equivalent of a lope, and the historical references stay relevant to the postwar puzzle. How can you govern a country whose villages implode in civil war? How dare you carpet-bomb such a country? Stewart confronts these issues by bunking with people who never get to pose these questions. He earns the right to be cranky, the right to call Taliban who lecture him about jihad "stupid" and to cry in a Scottish pub on the last page. Too much travel writing feels like dry history moistened by crocodile tears. The Places in Between feels as stinging as a dust storm and as aching as a day without food. Editor-s Note: Alec Appelbaum is freelance writer based in New York.

EURASIA_NET

2006-08-14

AFGHANISTAN: NEW SUPREME COURT COULD MARK GENUINE DEPARTURE [09:50:00]

Parliament’s recent approval of a new chief justice and eight other members of the Supreme Court could mark a notable step on the road to long-term stability and a democratic society. While Afghanistan has flirted with real and "kangaroo" parliaments in the past, genuine power has historically been held by the executive -- represented by kings, presidents, and commanders of the faithful. However, with few exceptions, the executive branch has had to walk a fine line with the judiciary, a branch that remained to varying degrees independent or even at odds with the executive branch. The judiciary -- formally or informally -- also assumed the role of safeguarding Islamic values and character. This prerogative became more entrenched after the communist takeover in 1978 and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union a year later. A Break with Precedent During the period of resistance to Soviet forces and their surrogates in Kabul, the elements who traditionally controlled and represented Afghanistan’s judiciary became a vanguard of the struggle. In 1992, those same elements took power in the capital, seemingly placing the executive and judiciary branches in the hands of a single group of people: They were the judges and the court functionaries, the ulama (mullahs), the clergy, and important hereditary religious families. Those groups have traditionally preserved their power bases and legitimacy by steering the Islamic sensibilities of the Afghan public in a highly conservative -- and unwavering -- direction. To date, Afghanistan’s judiciary has remained mostly in the hands of men from conservative religious circles. Since the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001, conservative circles have been in firm control of the judiciary, most notably the Supreme Court. The importance of the Supreme Court is boosted by the abysmal state of Afghanistan’s formal judicial system. That situation has resulted in increased involvement for the Supreme Court in even minor legal aspects of the country’s development. Moreover, the Supreme Court as envisaged in the constitution holds tremendous power over lower courts -- all the way down to district courts. That authority extends all the way to judicial appointments and directives on points of law. Ray of Hope? The makeup of the Supreme Court sworn in on August 5 is based less than its predecessor on strong ties to past Islamist governments and to prominent Afghans. This new court is headed by Abdul Salam Azimi. Azimi is a moderate technocrat with experience in law and education not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan, the Middle East, and the United States. He was also among the main drafters of the country’s current constitution. The other eight justices (Mohammad Qasem Hashemzai; Abdul Rashid Rashed; Gholam Nabi Nawai; Bahuddin Baha; Zamen Ali Behsudi; Mohammad Qasem; Mohammad Alim Nasimi; and Mohammad Omar Barakzai) include highly educated technocrats with seemingly moderate views and no obvious ties to conservative Islamist circles. The average age of new members is under 62, with the oldest member (Behsudi) 70 years old and the youngest (Nawai) 46. Critics accused the previous court of allying itself with conservative elements in the National Assembly in an effort to systematically challenge Afghanistan’s generally reform-mined executive branch. The new court is more likely to seek to establish itself as a contributor to stability. Its justices are arguably more disposed to safeguarding the Islamic character of Afghanistan as enshrined in the constitution while allowing gradual reforms within legal limits. They might also be expected to seek to respect Afghan traditions while trying not to perpetuate reactionary measures that might impede a march to democracy. The Afghan Constitution adopted in January of 2004 creates the judiciary branch as an organ of the state independent of the other two branches -- executive and legislative. Chief Justice Azimi and his new colleagues on the bench face a daunting task. They will certainly be tempted to reeducate Afghanistan’s judiciary branch from top to bottom. But they will also be expected to work to prevent the various centers of power in Afghanistan -- both formal and informal -- from grinding progress to a halt.

EURASIA_NET

2006-08-07

AFGHANISTAN: KABUL CANCELS CHRISTIAN GROUP’S EVENT, EXPELS ORGANIZERS [09:33:00]

Members of a South Korean Christian aid group that tried to organize a three-day "peace festival" in Afghanistan have been expelled after Islamic clerics accused them of trying to convert Muslims to Christianity. The event, scheduled to start on August 5, was to include a medical conference and two soccer games at Kabul’s Olympic Stadium between Korean players and Afghanistan’s national team. It was being organized by the Institute of Asian Culture and Development (IACD) -- a Seoul-based Christian humanitarian-aid group that has run medical clinics in Afghanistan since January 2002. Ali Askar Laly, an adviser for the Afghan Football Federation, told RFE/RL that complaints from Muslim clerics about proselytizing by the aid group’s members turned the "peace festival" into a contentious political issue for the Afghan government. Charges of Proselytizing "According to the information we have received, they wanted to do propaganda for Christianity here," he said. "Members of the South Korean nongovernmental organization that was bringing the [Korean soccer] team here were expelled from Afghanistan [August 2]. For that reason, it was not possible for [the Korean players] to come [and play]." Officials in Kabul say hundreds of South Korean Christians who arrived for the peace festival were warned not to "preach religion." But the officials say some group members ignored the warnings and were seen trying to convert Muslims -- a serious crime in the Islamic republic. Kang Sung Han is Central Asia director for the Institute of Asian Culture and Development. He tells RFE/RL that the allegations about evangelistic activities by his group are untrue. "No," he said. "Not at all. That is wrong information. We have no programs on religious activity nor any Christian rally. No. Not at all. All programs are for medical education and sports. No religious activities. Not at all. That is all wrong rumors. The IACD is shocked by these rumors. So we are very sad. And we regret these rumors." Kang says the Institute of Asian Culture is aware of Afghanistan’s religious sensitivities and Islamic traditions because the group has been running a medical clinic in the northern Afghan town of Sherbergan since January 2002. A Peaceful Festival? He told RFE/RL that the idea for the festival was to give ordinary Koreans and Afghans a chance to interact with each other peacefully. "We have been working in Afghanistan for the past five years," he said. "The IACD has known well about Afghanis and Islamic culture. We [just wanted to] make a sports project, a medical project, and a medical conference. We were to have our own meeting in a gymnasium on contributions to a brighter future for Afghanistan -- because we were bringing a list of 400 men from the United States and from Korea. They want to be involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan." Afghan officials say some 1,500 group members have entered Afghanistan on tourist visas in recent weeks. They arrived despite warnings from South Korea’s Foreign Ministry and Seoul’s embassy in Kabul that their presence could be seen as a provocation by conservative Islamists. Scores of group members who have arrived at Kabul Airport since August 2 have been refused entry visas and turned back by customs officials. Afghan authorities say all group members will be expelled from Afghanistan "as soon as possible" because their safety cannot be guaranteed. The Afghan Foreign Ministry has confirmed that it gave tourist visas to several hundred South Koreans who said they wanted to spread peace and help with reconstruction. Foreign Ministry adviser Daud Muradian says group leaders had promised not to preach religion or try to convert anyone. Clerics Complain But on August 2, Muslim clerics in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif demonstrated in the streets to call for the expulsions. Among them was cleric Said Hashemi. He explains to RFE/RL the allegations against the Seoul-based group. "Some Korean students who are Christians came as tourists to Afghanistan," he said. "Some came to Mazar-e Sharif -- and in addition to their tourist activities, they’ve been spreading Christian propaganda both secretly and overtly. Some time ago, in the presence of the religious adviser of the Afghan president, there were discussions in which provincial officials presented evidence about Christians spreading propaganda through documents and compact discs. They were seen doing this in one of the districts [of Balkh Province]." But Sher Jan Durani, a spokesman for the chief of the Afghan National Police in Balkh Province, tells RFE/RL that authorities in the northern province have no evidence that IACD members have tried to convert Muslims to Christianity. "There has been nothing in Mazar-e Sharif like [what the clerics] have described," he said. "If [Christian preaching and attempts at converting Muslims] is going on, for sure, the police of Mazar-e Sharif will arrest them and put them in jail according to the law." Religion is a sensitive matter in Afghanistan’s strictly Islamic society. In February, thousands of Afghan demonstrators took to the streets to demand the death penalty for an Afghan man who had converted to Christianity. The man, Abdur Rahman, was released from prison and sent to Italy under international pressure. Recent protests about the desecration of the Koran and Western newspaper cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad also have turned violent on the streets of Afghanistan.

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